Mission-type tactics - Auftragstaktik

Mission-type tactics ( Auftragstaktik, mission command), have been a central component of the tactics of German armed forces since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by opponents of the development of mission-type tactics.

In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in execution which allows a high-degree of flexibility at the Operational and Tactical levels of command. Mission-type Orders free the higher leadership from tactical details.

For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. The success of the doctrine rests upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. Clearly taking the risks of violating other previously expressed limitations as a routine step to achieving a mission is a behaviour most easily sustained in a particular type of innovative culture. That culture is often one associated today with elite units and not a whole army.

After the heavy defeat of the Prussians in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt by Napoleon in 1806, the Prussians rethought their military approach and aimed to build a college of military capability, the General Staff, as a systemic counter to the individual genius that had so soundly beaten them. Napoleon fought a continual battle of manoeuvre or movement and throughout his career (at least until Spain) demonstrated his ability to defeat all comers by the greater flexibility of his formations and deployment. The fact that his troops were mainly conscripts showed that it was his organisation of them that must be superior. The institutionalization of excellence within the Prussian Army was to build this same flexibility as well as the other role of the General Staff Officer, which was to make sure each unit understood and performed their mission.
 
Auftragstaktik can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising to some, Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.

İt is not a possibility to estimate whether the real condition on fields are going as they planned. Head office only can make assumptions how to react in the fog of war. If the information is out dated, giving decisions get harder. But it is possible that to give tasks or duty to subordinates and train them to give thier own decisions in diffucult occasion. Subordinates can give decisions and use  initiaves on given task.